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Diversity Jurisdiction and Injunctive Relief: 
Using a “Moving-Party Approach” to Value the 
Amount in Controversy 
Christopher A. Pinahs∗ 
Consider the following diversity jurisdiction hypothetical: 
Happy Apple Orchard is a family-owned apple farm struggling 
financially due to a sharp reduction in production. Once a 
thriving orchard, warmer than normal temperatures and a lack 
of rainfall have made apple growth impossible. The orchard 
owner, convinced the uncharacteristic weather is due to hu-
man-induced climate change, files for a permanent injunction 
to abate emissions from ABC Electric, a nearby coal-fired power 
plant. The apple orchard’s lost revenue or reduced property 
value are potential ways to value the amount in controversy.1 
What result occurs, however, if this plaintiff-centered approach 
fails to satisfy the amount in controversy necessary for diversi-
ty jurisdiction?2 Can a court consider the defendant’s com-
pliance cost, such as the value of temporarily closing the factory 
or installing pollution-mitigation technology, to satisfy the 
amount in controversy? The scenario is further complicated if 
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 1. See, e.g., Am.’s MoneyLine, Inc. v. Coleman, 360 F.3d 782, 787 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (noting that the amount in controversy is measured by the value of 
the object to the plaintiff ); Leonard v. Enter. Rent a Car, 279 F.3d 967, 973 
(11th Cir. 2002) (same). 
 2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006) (“The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the 
sum or value of $75,000 . . . .”). 
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the defendant power plant plans to file a counterclaim for def-
amation. Can consideration of the value of the counterclaim oc-
cur in the threshold evaluation for diversity jurisdiction? Un-
fortunately, under the current federal jurisdictional framework 
the answer to these questions is unclear. 
When a plaintiff alleges a sum certain—a set dollar 
amount above the jurisdictional threshold—no difficulty arises 
in determining eligibility for federal diversity jurisdiction.3 In-
junctions, however, are not a sum certain, and courts often 
struggle to value this intangible form of relief for purposes of 
diversity jurisdiction.4 Even assuming a court is able to esti-
mate such a monetary value, considerable confusion arises 
when the matter in controversy differently impacts the parties 
involved.5  
The federal circuit courts are split regarding the proper in-
junction valuation technique for diversity jurisdiction. The 
“plaintiff-viewpoint rule” considers only the value of the injunc-
tion to the plaintiff and is followed in the Second, Third, Fifth, 
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits.6 Historically, courts have fa-
vored this plaintiff-centered amount-in-controversy determina-
tion, but fewer opinions since 1980 have inflexibly endorsed the 
plaintiff-viewpoint approach.7 Instead, many contemporary de-
cisions grant jurisdiction if the threshold amount is satisfied 
from either the plaintiff ’s or defendant’s viewpoint. The First, 
 
 3. See Armistead M. Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount in the United States 
District Court, 38 HARV. L. REV. 733, 734 (1925) (“[C]ases at law present much 
less difficulty than those on the equity side of the court.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Ridder Bros., Inc. v. Blethen, 142 F.2d 395, 398 (9th Cir. 
1944) (noting confusion regarding the proper method to ascertain the jurisdic-
tional amount). 
 5. See, e.g., Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 790–91 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(holding the plaintiff ’s estimated benefit of eleven dollars as below the juris-
dictional amount and the cost of defendant’s compliance as over the jurisdic-
tional amount); see also Brittain Shaw McInnis, Comment, The $75,000.01 
Question: What Is the Value of Injunctive Relief?, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1013, 
1015 (1998) (stating that valuing claims for injunctive relief is especially diffi-
cult if the parties involved place different values on the same right). 
 6. See, e.g., Ericsson GE Mobile Commc’ns, Inc. v. Motorola Commc’ns & 
Elec., Inc., 120 F.3d 216, 219 (11th Cir. 1997); In re Corestates Trust Fee Lit-
ig., 39 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1994); Kheel v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 457 F.2d 46, 49 
(2d Cir. 1972); Mass. State Pharm. Ass’n v. Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc., 431 
F.2d 130, 132 (8th Cir. 1970); Scalise v. Nat’l Util. Serv., 120 F.2d 938, 940 
(5th Cir. 1941). 
 7. See 1 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 0.91[1] (Dan-
ielle R. Coquillette et al. eds., 2d ed. 1996). 
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Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits employ this 
“either-viewpoint technique.”8  
Yet another method, the “moving-party approach,” sup-
ported by several district court decisions9 and dicta from anoth-
er court of appeals,10 is a third approach to valuing injunctions. 
It values the amount in controversy from the plaintiff ’s view-
point when establishing original jurisdiction and the defend-
ant’s viewpoint in cases brought to the federal courts through 
removal jurisdiction.11  
The valuation techniques addressed in this Note lack defin-
itive Supreme Court direction. To address the competing valua-
tion frameworks, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2002 
in Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley.12 In McCauley, the district 
court denied federal subject-matter jurisdiction when the plain-
tiffs’ individual claims for relief were less than the jurisdiction-
al amount, but the defendant’s cost of compliance was great-
er.13 The decision to dismiss the case was appealed to the 
Supreme Court, principally to determine the viewpoint from 
which to value injunctive relief.14 At oral argument, the Court 
noted that a decision on the merits would “solve an important 
and serious problem of jurisdiction that [was] plaguing the low-
 
 8. See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co./Citibank, 264 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 
2001), cert. granted in part sub nom. Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley, 534 U.S. 
1126 (2002), and cert. dismissed, 537 U.S. 1 (2002); McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline 
Co., 595 F.2d 389, 395 (7th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Washington, 593 F.2d 1097, 
1099 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass’n, 414 F.2d 311, 
314 (1st Cir. 1969); Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Lally, 327 F.2d 568, 569 (4th Cir. 
1964); Ronzio v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 116 F.2d 604, 606 (10th Cir. 1940). 
 9. See, e.g., Bedell v. H.R.C. Ltd., 522 F. Supp. 732, 736 (E.D. Ky. 1981) 
(“[I]t is clear that the requisite jurisdictional amount exists, for the defendant 
has already expended more than $400,000 . . . .”); Inman v. Milwhite Co., 261 
F. Supp. 703, 708 (E.D. Ark. 1966) (“[W]here federal jurisdiction is invoked by 
the party standing to gain or lose more than his adversary the greater gain or 
the greater loss should be applied as the criterion of jurisdictional amount.”). 
 10. See Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 
1969) (holding that the party seeking removal has the burden of establishing 
the required amount in controversy). 
 11. Bedell, 522 F. Supp. at 735; see also 14AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET 
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3703, at 562 (4th ed. 2011). 
 12. 534 U.S. 1126, cert. dismissed, 537 U.S. 1. 
 13. See In re Ford, 264 F.3d at 955–56 (discussing the district court’s 
holding).  
 14. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7–8, McCauley, 534 U.S. 1126 
(No. 01-896) (noting that the principal issue on appeal was the viewpoint from 
which to assess the amount in controversy).  
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er courts.”15 The case’s procedural posture led to its dismissal,16 
but the grant of certiorari and the Court’s comments, nonethe-
less, illustrate that pressing ambiguities exist in the current 
valuation framework.  
This Note argues for adoption of a “moving-party ap-
proach” for purposes of satisfying the amount-in-controversy 
requirement in diversity jurisdiction claims. Part I introduces 
the historical and theoretical basis for diversity and removal 
jurisdiction, as well as the current Supreme Court framework 
for valuing injunctive relief. Part II examines why the two pri-
mary injunction valuation techniques currently employed in 
federal circuit courts only partially adhere to the underlying ra-
tionale for diversity jurisdiction. Finally, Part III argues for 
adoption of the moving-party approach through either a Su-
preme Court order or legislative amendment. This Note con-
cludes that the most appropriate injunction valuation tech-
nique for purposes of diversity jurisdiction is the moving-party 
approach because it values the true object of litigation without 
overly extending federal jurisdiction.  
I.  FASHIONING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: EXAMINING THE 
RATIONALE FOR CREATING DIVERSITY JURISDICTION   
The issuance of injunctive relief is left primarily to the 
court’s discretion.17 In most cases, judges undertake a balanc-
ing of interests and are reluctant to issue an injunction unless 
the plaintiff is threatened by an injury for which no legal reme-
dy exists.18 The criteria for granting an injunction does not, 
however, confer subject-matter or personal jurisdiction.19 As in 
most civil actions, the litigants must plead an independent ba-
 
 15. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, McCauley, 537 U.S. 1 (No. 01-896) 
(per curiam), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/01-896.pdf. 
 16. See McCauley, 537 U.S. at 2. 
 17. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312–19 (1982) 
(balancing equities in determination of whether to grant an injunction).  
 18. See Bonaparte v. Camden & A.R. Co., 3 F. Cas. 821, 827 (C.C.D.N.J. 
1830) (No. 1617) (noting that an injunction should be granted only where 
courts cannot “afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages”). 
Rule 65 enumerates three forms of injunctive relief—temporary restraining 
orders, preliminary injunctions, and permanent injunctions—but for purposes 
of this Note, no distinction is required because courts value these three orders 
similarly. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65. 
 19. See, e.g., Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church & State v. City 
of Denver, 628 F.2d 1289, 1299 (10th Cir. 1980) (“[R]ule 65 [authorizing in-
junctive relief ] confers no jurisdiction.”). 
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sis for asserting federal-question or diversity jurisdiction.20 
Thus, when requesting injunctive relief in federal diversity 
suits, plaintiffs must show not only that a remedy at law does 
not exist, but that the value of the requested injunctive relief is 
sufficient to meet the amount-in-controversy determination.  
As previously discussed, the circuit courts are split regard-
ing the proper viewpoint from which to make this determina-
tion.21 As a means to resolve disagreement, this Part examines 
the Framers’ rationale for creating diversity jurisdiction and 
discusses Congress’s subsequent actions to limit the number of 
diversity claims reaching federal court. Additionally, this Part 
discusses the ambiguous state of Supreme Court precedent that 
led to competing injunction valuation techniques. More specifi-
cally, this Part outlines the history of diversity jurisdiction ju-
risprudence, noting that diversity jurisdiction was created to 
protect litigants against out-of-state biases without turning 
federal courts into courts of general jurisdiction.  
A. THE HISTORICAL BASIS FOR DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 
When fashioning a proper injunction valuation technique, 
it is necessary to examine the Framers’ rationale for including 
diversity jurisdiction in Article III of the Constitution.22 Al-
though diversity jurisdiction traces its origins back to the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789 and has been in place longer than federal-
question jurisdiction,23 some ambiguity exists regarding the ra-
tionale for its implementation,24 resulting in disagreement 
since the Constitutional Convention.25 
The traditional justification for diversity jurisdiction is 
that the Framers sought to avoid prejudice against out-of-state 
litigants in state courts.26 In Bank of the United States v. De-
 
 20. 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2941, at 35 (2d ed. 1995). 
 21. See supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text. 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all 
Cases, in Law and Equity . . . between Citizens of different States . . . .”). 
 23. John J. Parker, Dual Sovereignty and the Federal Courts, 51 NW. U. L. 
REV. 407, 408 (1956). 
 24. Martin A. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Be-
tween State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian 
Chronicles,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1800 (1992). 
 25. See James William Moore & Donald Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: 
Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1–4 (1964) (discussing “sharp at-
tacks” on diversity jurisdiction as far back as the Constitutional Convention). 
 26. See John P. Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE 
L.J. 7, 12 (1963); Redish, supra note 24, at 1800; Hessel E. Yntema & George 
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veaux, the Court noted that the goal of diversity jurisdiction is 
to “preserve the real equity of citizens throughout the union” in 
order to protect against “local prejudices, in particular states.”27  
Some judicial scholars, however, question whether protec-
tion of out-of-state litigants was the actual rationale for diversi-
ty jurisdiction.28 For example, Judge Henry Friendly noted 
“that there was little cause to fear that the state tribunals 
would be hostile to litigants from other states.”29 Instead, he 
argued “that the desire to protect creditors against [state] legis-
lation favorable to debtors was a principal reason for the grant 
of diversity jurisdiction.”30 In response, however, Chief Justice 
Taft posited that protecting creditors and out-of-state litigants 
was essentially the same.31 He contended that creditors were 
more likely to invest capital in out-of-state jurisdictions if they 
were assured the opportunity to litigate free from local biases, 
such as in the uniform federal system.32 Thus, it appears pro-
tecting out-of-state litigants, from one form of prejudice or 
another, is the rationale for implementing diversity jurisdic-
tion.33  
In fashioning a proper injunction valuation technique, the 
rationale for inclusion of diversity jurisdiction in Article III is of 
no more than academic concern if prejudice is no longer 
 
H. Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 
869, 870 n.1 (1931) (discussing how diversity jurisdiction is “designed to secure 
citizens against discrimination”). 
 27. Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809), over-
ruled in part by Louisville C. & C.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844); 
see also Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945) (“Diversity jurisdic-
tion is founded on assurance to non-resident litigants of courts free from sus-
ceptibility to potential local bias.”); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 
(1938) (stating that “[d]iversity of citizenship jurisdiction” prevents “discrimi-
nation in state courts against those not citizens of the State”). But see Joel M. 
Feinberg, Establishing Federal Jurisdictional Amount by a Counterclaim, 21 
MO. L. REV. 243, 256 (1956) (explaining that hostility to nonresidents is non-
existent today).  
 28. See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 
HARV. L. REV. 483, 497 (1928). 
 29. Id.; see also Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 
(1816) (noting that the Constitution presumed “whether rightly or wrongly” 
that state allegiances were the rationale for diversity jurisdiction). 
 30. Friendly, supra note 28, at 496–97. 
 31. See Parker, supra note 23, at 410. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in His-
torical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1460 (2008) (stat-
ing that diversity jurisdiction was intended to protect litigants from bias in 
states other than their own). 
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present. To this end, some scholars propose that increased 
“travel and communication have unified the nation and reduced 
interstate xenophobia.”34 This does not mitigate the fact, how-
ever, that state judges are often elected and “more directly tied 
to the community than their federal counterparts,”35 resulting 
in potential prejudice favoring in-state well-being.36  
The perception of local biases led to numerous empirical 
studies examining the prevalence of prejudice against out-of-
state defendants, but the results were mixed.37 The inconclu-
sive nature of these studies, however, is not surprising given 
that asking state court judges and prospective jurors if they can 
be fair to out-of-state litigants invariably invites unpredictable 
results.38 The extent of litigant bias is not entirely clear,39 but 
Congress has not chosen to abolish diversity jurisdiction, and 
 
 34. Redish, supra note 24, at 1801. 
 35. Id.; see also RICHARD NEELY, WHY COURTS DON’T WORK 27 (1982) (“In 
many states judges run for office and this means they must be members of po-
litical parties . . . .”); David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American 
Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1968) (discussing “life tenure, independ-
ence, respectable salary, and [the] prestige of the federal bench” as reasons for 
high caliber decisions in federal courts). 
 36. Redish, supra note 24, at 1801; see also David L. Shapiro, Federal Di-
versity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317, 339 
(1977) (noting that bias may be more prevalent in some jurisdictions than oth-
ers). But see Feinberg, supra note 27, at 249 (“[T]he original policy basis of di-
versity jurisdiction, fear of local prejudice against foreign parties, is largely a 
fiction today.”). 
 37. Compare Kristin Bumiller, Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases: Analy-
sis of a Survey and Implications for Reform, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 749, 761 
(1980–1981) (citing the “provincialism” of rural areas as creating an out-of-
state bias), and Jerry Goldman & Kenneth S. Marks, Diversity Jurisdiction 
and Local Bias: A Preliminary Empirical Inquiry, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 104 
(1980) (noting “fear and local bias” as entering the calculus in forum selection), 
and Note, The Choice Between State and Federal Court in Diversity Cases in 
Virginia, 51 VA. L. REV. 178, 179–84 (1965) (reporting that sixty percent of 
responding Virginia attorneys selected a federal forum due to out-of-state bi-
as), with Marvin R. Summers, Analysis of Factors that Influence Choice of Fo-
rum in Diversity Cases, 47 IOWA L. REV. 933, 937–38 (1962) (finding only 4.3 
percent of responding Wisconsin lawyers mentioned bias). An additional study 
found bias was a regional phenomenon. See Neal Miller, An Empirical Study 
of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal Question Ju-
risdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 407–12 (1992) (finding low levels of bias 
against out-of-state litigants in the industrialized Midwest and far-West as 
opposed to southern states). 
 38. Currie, supra note 35, at 5 n.19. 
 39. Cf. Redish, supra note 24, at 1803 (“The dangers of prejudice may of-
ten be subtle, but that only makes them more insidious.”). 
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thus injunction valuation should mirror the Framers’ impetus, 
preventing out-of-state litigant bias, for Article III inclusion.40  
B. CONGRESS CURTAILS DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 
Article III diversity jurisdiction opens federal court doors 
to diverse claims that satisfy the amount-in-controversy thresh-
old.41 Rather paradoxically, however, it has become an Ameri-
can jurisprudential principle that federal courts are limited in 
jurisdiction42 and reticent to hear diversity claims.43 
Although Article III permits diversity jurisdiction,44 Con-
gress passed diversity45 and removal statutes46 to limit jurisdic-
tion. The diversity statute limits standing to cases between “cit-
izens of different states . . . where the matter in controversy 
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and 
costs.”47 Further, the concept of diversity is restricted by 
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, which requires complete diversity—all 
parties on one side of the suit must be diverse from all parties 
on the other side(s).48  
 
 40. See McInnis, supra note 5, at 1024 (“[C]ourts, in analyzing the prob-
lem [fashioning an injunction valuation method], should examine the history 
and purpose of diversity jurisdiction.”). As recently as the 2010 term, the 
Court reiterated the “relevant purposive concern” of diversity jurisdiction as 
reducing “prejudice[s] against an out-of-state party.” See Hertz Corp. v. 
Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192 (2010). 
 41. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). 
 42. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) 
(“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.”); see also Bowles v. Russell, 
551 U.S. 205, 212–13 (2007) (“Because Congress decides whether federal 
courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine when, and under what con-
ditions, federal courts can hear them.”); Frank, supra note 26, at 9 (“The origi-
nal federal court jurisdiction was almost entirely permissive; the Congress 
was under no obligation to create federal trial courts at all . . . .”). 
 43. See, e.g., Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 351 (1961) (ex-
plaining the increase in controversy requirement from $3000 to $10,000 was to 
reduce congestion in the federal courts). 
 44. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 45. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
 46. See id. § 1441. 
 47. Id. § 1332. 
 48. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267–68 (1806), over-
ruled in part by Louisville C. & C.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844) 
(“[E]ach distinct interest should be represented by persons, all of whom are 
entitled to sue, or may be sued, in the federal courts.”). It should be noted that 
not until 1967 did the Court explain that the complete diversity requirement 
was statutorily, rather than constitutionally, based. See State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967) (discussing diversity jurisdic-
tion and how the legislature determined its usage). 
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In addition to limiting 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to claims between 
diverse citizens, Congress amended this section to classify cor-
porations as citizens of both the state of incorporation and the 
principal place of business,49 again limiting the reach of diver-
sity jurisdiction.50 Similarly, Congress has steadily raised the 
threshold jurisdictional amount required for diversity jurisdic-
tion. It started at $500 in 1789,51 and has been raised five sub-
sequent times to the current amount of $75,000.52 Although Ar-
ticle III opens the federal courts to diversity claims, Congress 
has greatly curtailed eligible cases,53 restricting diversity dis-
putes to those of large monetary value and between completely 
diverse citizens.54 It has done largely the same for cases seek-
ing federal jurisdiction through the removal statute.  
At first glance, the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, ap-
pears to reopen the federal court doors.55 Section 1441(a) allows 
“any civil action brought in a State court of which the district 
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction . . . [to] be 
removed by the defendant.”56 As stated, however, the statute 
applies exclusively to civil actions and is available only to de-
fendants.57 Further, the defendant must file a request for re-
moval within thirty days of receiving the original or amended 
complaint and may not remove any action subsequent one year 
of the suit commencing.58 Consequently, savvy plaintiffs regu-
 
 49. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415, 415. 
 50. See Redish, supra note 24, at 1804 (discussing how Congress has at-
tempted to limit diversity jurisdiction). 
 51. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. These increases 
have been slightly higher than inflation. See Jaren Casazza, Note, Valuation 
of Diversity Jurisdiction Claims in the Federal Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
1280, 1283 n.11 (2004). 
 52. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1453–54 (5th ed. 2003) (describ-
ing the raising of the amount to $2000 in 1887, $3000 in 1911, $10,000 in 
1958, $50,000 in 1988, and $75,000 in 1996). 
 53. See Harold Epstein, Comment, Federal Courts: Jurisdictional Amount 
in Injunction Suits in Federal District Courts, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 336, 336 (1936) 
(“At no time has Congress seen fit to give the federal District Courts the ful-
lest measure of jurisdiction allowable under the Constitution.”). But see Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4, 5 (stating that 
a purpose of the Act is to “restore the intent of the framers . . . by providing for 
Federal court consideration of interstate cases . . . under diversity jurisdiction”). 
 54. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006) (enumerating a $75,000 amount in con-
troversy minimum and outlining other diversity requirements). 
 55. Id. § 1441. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. § 1446(b). 
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larly amend their complaint to more than the statutory amount 
only after the one-year window has elapsed, thus guaranteeing 
their case will be heard in state court.59 Additionally, removal 
is not allowed if the action is filed in the home state of the de-
fendant.60 The general tenor of the removal statute is one of 
“strict construction,”61 with the federal courts reticent to in-
fringe on general principles of federalism.62 
The oft-cited rationale for curtailing diversity jurisdiction 
is to prevent the “diversion of judge-power” to “the dullest cas-
es” that result in a clogging of the federal courts.63 Docket con-
trol considerations attract commentary, including from the Su-
preme Court64 and the American Law Institute,65 but have 
failed to generate enough support to overturn the diversity 
statute altogether. Proponents of diversity jurisdiction counter 
that federal courts do not exist for the purpose of clearing their 
dockets. Rather, their goal is to create judicial uniformity, to 
interpret and enforce federal law, and “to prevent interstate 
prejudices and allegiances from balkanizing the nation.”66 Ir-
 
 59. See Michael W. Lewis, Comedy or Tragedy: The Tale of Diversity Ju-
risdiction and the One-Year Bar, 62 SMU L. REV. 201, 201–02 (2009) (citing 
Omi’s Custard Co. v. Relish This, LLC, No. 04-cv-861-DRH, 2006 WL 
2460573, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2006)) (describing an instance where a plain-
tiff with a cognizable $3 million claim files a complaint for damages of only 
$74,900 and waits for the one-year removal restriction to pass). 
 60. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (“Any other such action shall be removable only if 
none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a 
citizen of the State in which the action was brought.”). 
 61. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941) 
(noting both the language of the Act of 1887 and subsequent congressional ac-
tion as evidence for strict construction of the removal statute); see also Luther 
v. Countrywide Homes Loan Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“In general, removal statutes are strictly construed against removal.”). 
 62. Sheets, 313 U.S. at 108–09 (acknowledging that state power to resolve 
controversies may only be abridged by an act of Congress in conformity to the 
Judiciary Articles of the Constitution). 
 63. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 141, 
144 (1973); see also Shapiro, supra note 36, at 317–18 (advocating that few 
cases belong in federal courts). 
 64. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 672 (1950) 
(noting the difficulty of making federal judges decide state law cases). 
 65. See AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION 
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1302, at 124 (1969) (recognizing that 
federal courts often offer a speedier trial because of “lesser docket congestion”). 
 66. Redish, supra note 24, at 1786. Professor Redish argues that restrict-
ing diversity claims because of docket concerns is an “‘astrological sign’ ap-
proach” because “equally as rational a result would have been achieved by 
elimination of all cases brought by those born under the signs Pisces, Leo, and 
Virgo.” Id. at 1787. 
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respective of its validity, docket control considerations shaped 
the current diversity framework67 and, as such, they should be 
considered in fashioning a proper injunction valuation method. 
C. SUPREME COURT INJUNCTION VALUATION FRAMEWORK 
In an action for injunction, it is well settled that the 
amount in controversy is measured by the value of the litigated 
object.68 What is less clear, however, is how to measure the 
value of this litigated object.69 The diversity statute fails to 
specify a viewpoint from which to value the amount in contro-
versy,70 and, as such, courts are left to the statute’s historical 
underpinnings. Given these seemingly contradictory signals—
opening federal courts to protect out-of-state litigants vis-à-vis 
restricting the reach of the diversity and removal statutes to 
reduce docket loads71—it is unsurprising that the circuit courts 
are split regarding a proper injunction valuation technique. 
Unfortunately, attempts by the Supreme Court to clarify this 
issue have done little to assuage ambiguity. One judicial schol-
ar even went so far as to describe the Court’s precedent as 
reading “more like Delphic riddles than carefully plotted legal 
reasoning.”72  
The first Supreme Court case addressing the issue was 
Mississippi & Missouri Railroad Co. v. Ward, where a steam-
boat owner sought removal of a bridge over the Mississippi 
River.73 The Court upheld jurisdiction between diverse citizens, 
stating: “But the want of a sufficient amount of damage having 
been sustained to give the federal courts jurisdiction, will not 
defeat the remedy, as the removal of the obstruction is the mat-
ter of controversy, and the value of the object must govern.”74 
Historic syntax aside, the decision provides little in terms of di-
rection. The plaintiff ’s steamboat business, the cost of removing 
 
 67. See id.  
 68. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977). 
 69. See Ericsson GE Mobile Commc’ns, Inc. v. Motorola Commc’ns & Elec., 
Inc., 120 F.3d 216, 218 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Whether courts, in determining the 
amount in controversy, are to measure the value of the object of the litigation 
solely from the plaintiff ’s perspective or whether they may also consider the 
value of the object from the defendant’s perspective is considerably less well-
established.”).  
 70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). 
 71. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 72. McInnis, supra note 5, at 1039. 
 73. Miss. & Mo. R.R. Co. v. Ward, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 485, 491–92 (1863). 
 74. Id. at 492. 
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the bridge, or the plaintiff ’s right to be free of obstruction all fit 
the Court’s “value of the object” inquiry,75 so it is no wonder 
Ward has left subsequent courts without clear direction.76  
The Court again tried to clarify the injunction valuation 
framework in Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light, 
Heat & Power Co.77 In this case, the plaintiff electric company 
sought to enjoin a rival company from erecting poles and wires 
that interfered with its business activities.78 The trial court 
dismissed the case after determining that the defendant’s cost 
of removing the poles was less than the jurisdictional amount,79 
but the Supreme Court reversed on grounds that the plaintiff ’s 
right to operate, exclusive of defendant’s interference, exceeded 
the jurisdictional threshold.80  
Glenwood seemingly supports a plaintiff-centered ap-
proach, but its holding and numerous other cases cited as sup-
port for the plaintiff-viewpoint technique81 fail to foreclose the 
possibility that jurisdiction is present if the value to the defend-
ant is greater than the statutory requirement.82 No Supreme 
Court decisions reject subject-matter jurisdiction when the 
statutorily prescribed amount in controversy is satisfied from 
the defendant’s viewpoint, and only a case of this character can 
conclusively establish the plaintiff viewpoint approach.83 
Advocates for an either-viewpoint framework cite Smith v. 
Adams.84 The Smith Court enumerated the amount in contro-
 
 75. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 3703, at 541. 
 76. Judge Learned Hand noted that Ward is “at best ambiguous.” See 
M&M Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 186 F.2d 157, 158 (2d Cir. 1950). 
 77. 239 U.S. 121 (1915). 
 78. Id. at 122–24. 
 79. Id. at 125. 
 80. Id. at 126 (“The District Court erred in testing the jurisdiction by the 
amount that it would cost defendant to remove its poles and wires . . . . Com-
plainant sets up a right to maintain and operate its plant and conduct its 
business free from wrongful interference by defendant. This right is alleged to 
be of a value in excess of the jurisdictional amount . . . .”). 
 81. Armistead Dobie, a Fourth Circuit judge, relied upon Western & 
A.R.R. v. Railroad Commission of Georgia, 261 U.S. 264 (1923), Bitterman v. 
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 207 U.S. 205 (1907), and Hunt v. New 
York Cotton Exchange, 205 U.S. 322 (1907), to support the plaintiff-viewpoint 
approach. See Dobie, supra note 3, at 742–44; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra 
note 11, § 3703, at 541, 551.  
 82. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 3703, at 551–52. 
 83. Id. at 552. 
 84. 130 U.S. 167 (1889); see Hoffman v. Vulcan Materials Co., 19 F. Supp. 
2d 475, 480–81 (M.D.N.C. 1998) (noting that proponents of the either-
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versy as not only the money judgment requested, but also un-
der certain circumstances, the “increased or diminished value 
of the property directly affected by the relief prayed.”85 While 
this decision lends insight into the Court’s amount-in-
controversy determination, the language was dicta and did not 
bind future Court decisions.86 Other circuit courts cite Illinois 
v. City of Milwaukee,87 an interstate water pollution dispute, as 
supporting the either-viewpoint approach.88 This case held that 
“[t]he considerable interests involved in the purity of interstate 
waters would seem to put beyond question the jurisdictional 
amount.”89 As one commentator noted, the Court in City of 
Milwaukee cited to Glenwood, Ward, a Tenth Circuit opinion, a 
federal practice treatise, and law review commentary, but ex-
plained that “reading the Court’s string cites like tea leaves is a 
dubious method of legal scholarship.”90 The dictum of the 
Court’s decision in City of Milwaukee appears to support an ei-
ther-viewpoint approach, but this esoteric language fails to 
provide decisive authority.91 
Prior to the Court’s decision in City of Milwaukee, a uni-
form framework for valuing injunctions failed to emerge and 
resolving this discord became even more difficult in 1948 with 
the passage of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).92 Section 1447(d) prohibits 
the appeal of federal court decisions that remand cases to state 
court.93 Although implemented with the laudatory goal of mov-
ing cases along on the merits and reducing protracted jurisdic-
tional litigation,94 it had the ancillary side effect of freezing in 
 
viewpoint rule rely on Smith because no Supreme Court case “definitively es-
tablishes their test”). 
 85. Smith, 130 U.S. at 175. 
 86. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935) (citing 
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821)) (acknowledging that 
dicta, although persuasive, are not controlling). 
 87. 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972). 
 88. See McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d 389, 393–94 (7th Cir. 
1979) (noting that City of Milwaukee provides important but cryptic direction); 
cf. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (not-
ing the per se approach taken by the City of Milwaukee Court). 
 89. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 98. 
 90. McInnis, supra note 5, at 1042. 
 91. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 3703, at 566 (“[T]his dictum can 
be read as a cryptic suggestion that a federal court may take a view for juris-
dictional amount purposes from the perspective of either party.”). 
 92. Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 84, 63 Stat. 89, 102.  
 93. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2006). 
 94. See Joan Steinman, Removal, Remand, and Review in Pendent Claim 
and Pendent Party Cases, 41 VAND. L. REV. 923, 997 & n.352 (1988). 
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place injunction valuation jurisprudence. This is because appel-
late review is not possible from decisions by federal court 
judges, such as occurred in McCauley, remanding cases for lack 
of subject-matter jurisdiction.95  
No injunction valuation technique finds direct support in 
congressional intent or Supreme Court holdings.96 Consequent-
ly, it is not surprising that lower courts struggle to fashion a 
uniform valuation procedure, especially given that their only 
guidance, as outlined in this Part, is to protect out-of-state liti-
gants while simultaneously limiting the breadth of diversity ju-
risdiction. In response, courts have fashioned two leading ap-
proaches to injunction valuation. The next Part examines these 
approaches and explains why neither method comprehensively 
adheres to the considerations that shaped diversity jurisdiction.  
II.  DRAWBACKS TO THE CURRENT INJUNCTION 
VALUATION FRAMEWORK   
The viewpoint from which to value the amount in contro-
versy is a particularly thorny issue.97 The federal circuit courts 
have been left to fashion their own approach to valuing injunc-
tive relief, due to a lack of Supreme Court direction.98 Two pri-
mary techniques have arisen,99 and this leaves litigants uncer-
tain as to their prospects of federal court admittance.100  
 
 95. Section 1447(d) limits the number of cases eligible for appellate review. 
It does not, however, completely preclude such review. See infra Part III.C. 
 96. See McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d 389, 392–94 (7th Cir. 
1979) (describing the difficulty courts have had in deciding upon a valuation 
method in suits for injunctive relief ). 
 97. See Recent Case, Amount in Controversy; Suit to Set Aside Workmen’s 
Compensation Award, 46 MINN. L. REV. 960, 962–63 (1962) (“Since the incep-
tion of the amount in controversy requirement for diversity suits, questions 
concerning the factors to be considered in determining the jurisdictional amount 
have plagued the courts.”); Note, The Effect of the Horton Case on the Determina-
tion of the Amount in Controversy Under Statutes Limiting Federal Court Ju-
risdiction, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 200, 200 (1962) (“The determination of the ‘value 
of the matter in controversy’ is a continuing problem of federal jurisdiction.”). 
 98. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 3703, at 537–66 (describing the 
various approaches taken by federal circuit courts); id. § 3703, at 538 (“The 
leading [Supreme Court] case on the point is so cryptic—and so old—that it 
sheds little if any light on the answer to this question.”). 
 99. Eleven of the twelve circuits purport to follow either the plaintiff or 
either-party viewpoints. See supra notes 6, 8 and accompanying text.  
 100. See Comment, Federal Jurisdictional Amount Requirement in Injunc-
tion Suits, 49 YALE L.J. 274, 284 (1939) (explaining that litigants may be left 
“somewhat in the dark as to their prospects of gaining admittance to the fed-
eral courts”). 
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To clarify the issue, this Part analyzes the two amount-in-
controversy approaches and explains why each is less than sat-
isfactory—indicating that large-scale reconsideration of the in-
junction valuation framework is necessary. More specifically, it 
argues that the plaintiff-viewpoint approach fails to properly 
gauge the value of the litigated object and promotes out-of-state 
prejudices, while the either-party viewpoint overextends feder-
al jurisdiction in such a fashion that it conflicts with the histor-
ical scope of the diversity statute.  
A. PLAINTIFF-VIEWPOINT APPROACH 
The plaintiff-viewpoint approach to injunction valuation 
considers only the value to the plaintiff of the right sought.101 
Judging the amount in controversy from the plaintiff ’s view-
point is logical considering the plaintiff is the “master of the 
claim”102 and because the sum alleged by the plaintiff controls 
if made in good faith.103 Further, the plaintiff-viewpoint ap-
proach is consistent with the “well-pleaded complaint” rule that 
prevents plaintiffs from creating federal subject-matter juris-
diction merely by anticipating defendant defenses.104 In other 
words, the plaintiff-viewpoint approach prevents a defendant, 
merely by recasting the cost of injunctive relief, to defeat the 
plaintiff ’s choice-of-law forum.105  
 
 101. See Dobie, supra note 3, at 734–36. 
 102. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); see also Lonny 
S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal 
Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. 
REV. 1217, 1244 (2008) (noting the long-standing principal that the plaintiff is 
master of the complaint). 
 103. See Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 
288 (1938). 
 104. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) 
(“[A] suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only 
when the plaintiff ’s statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based 
upon those laws or that Constitution.”). The well-pleaded complaint rule is typi-
cally applied in federal-question cases, Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 392, but 
the Supreme Court recently explained its application in the diversity context. 
See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005) 
(“When the well-pleaded complaint contains at least one claim that satisfies the 
amount-in-controversy requirement . . . the district court, beyond all question, 
has original jurisdiction over that claim.” (emphasis added)). This Note adopts 
the Court’s use of the well-pleaded complaint rule in Allapattah Services and 
refers only to the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s amount-in-controversy pleadings. 
 105. Cf. Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 99 (stating that “the plaintiff would be 
master of nothing” if the defendant could recast the jurisdictional require-
ments); Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. at 294 (explaining that the plaintiff ’s claim 
“fixes the right of the defendant to remove”). 
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Supporting the plaintiff-viewpoint approach is the prin-
ciple that federal courts are limited in jurisdiction.106 Because 
the plaintiff-viewpoint rule considers only the pecuniary value 
of the injunction to the plaintiff and disregards the defendant’s 
cost of compliance,107 fewer cases are eligible for federal juris-
diction—supporting Congress’s desire to limit the number of 
diversity suits obtaining federal jurisdiction.108 Courts that 
analyze the jurisdictional amount from only the plaintiff ’s 
viewpoint limit federal jurisdiction and simplify the valuation 
inquiry by considering the amount-in-controversy from only one 
party’s perspective.  
The plaintiff-viewpoint’s ease of application and greater 
certainty of results are often cited as underlying rationales for 
the rule.109 Some courts find, however, that excluding variables 
from the valuation inquiry causes parties to contest what fac-
tors are permitted, potentially complicating the jurisdictional 
determination.110 Further, because the plaintiff-viewpoint 
amount-in-controversy inquiry only examines the benefit to the 
plaintiff of the right requested and fails to consider the defend-
ant’s cost of compliance, the approach potentially understates 
the true value of the litigated object.111  
Casting the value of the litigated object from the plaintiff ’s 
viewpoint is not only facially unfair to defendants, but it also 
contradicts the diversity statute’s attempts to protect against 
out-of-state biases. This is because plaintiffs’ lawyers are often 
familiar with the state forum they choose and know how to 
maximize local biases, which leads to greater plaintiff success 
 
 106. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 
(1994) (noting that federal courts are limited in jurisdiction); Bender v. Wil-
liamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (same). 
 107. See Dobie, supra note 3, at 735–36. 
 108. See Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. at 288 (“The intent . . . to restrict federal 
jurisdiction in controversies between citizens of different states has always 
been rigorously enforced by the courts.”). 
 109. See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 3703, at 550; Dobie, supra 
note 3, at 736. 
 110. Associated Press v. Emmett, 45 F. Supp. 907, 914–15 (S.D. Cal. 1942) 
(explaining that the plaintiff-viewpoint model “is not always easy to apply” in 
the context of considering the applicability of liquidated damages (citing Smith 
v. Adams, 130 U.S. 167, 175 (1889))). 
 111. See Alfonso v. Hillsborough Cnty. Aviation Auth., 308 F.2d 724, 727 
(5th Cir. 1962) (refusing to consider the value of the object of litigation from 
the defendant’s perspective). 
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rates.112 A recent survey of diversity cases showed that plaintiff 
win rates dropped from seventy-one percent in original diversi-
ty cases to thirty-four percent in cases removed to federal 
court.113 The authors of the study noted that state biases are 
not the only factors driving these results,114 but since the plain-
tiff-viewpoint approach only considers the value of the injunc-
tion to the plaintiff, fewer cases are eligible for removal juris-
diction and, in turn, fewer cases have the opportunity to avoid 
potentially biased state courts.  
Latent biases also arise in the context of counterclaims. 
Suppose, for example, that Happy Apple Orchard files suit 
against ABC Electric in a plaintiff-viewpoint jurisdiction. Since 
the court will only consider the value to the plaintiff of the 
right it seeks to protect, the power plant cannot remove the 
case to federal court unless the plaintiff ’s claim is for more 
than the jurisdictional amount. Not only are defendants forced 
to litigate amongst in-state biases in this scenario, but they al-
so must do so when possessing a compulsory counterclaim for 
more than the jurisdictional amount. The practical implication 
of this restriction is that if ABC Electric has evidence that 
Happy Apple’s claim is unfounded and wishes to file a compul-
sory counterclaim that exceeds the jurisdictional amount,115 it 
cannot use this claim to satisfy the minimum amount-in-
controversy requirement.116 This inequity against out-of-state 
litigants, which is ameliorated when courts look beyond the ini-
tial claimant’s perspective,117 illustrates how the plaintiff-
viewpoint framework fails to adhere to the Framers’ desire for 
diversity jurisdiction to protect against out-of-state biases.  
The plaintiff-viewpoint approach limits the number of cas-
es reaching federal courts. Although this comports with Con-
gress’s general desire to limit federal jurisdiction, the approach 
fails to consider the defendant’s cost of compliance and contra-
 
 112. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Re-
ally Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Juris-
diction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 599 (1998).  
 113. Id. at 594 tbl.1. 
 114. See id. at 599 (noting disparities in court quality and differences in 
procedural law as also affecting plaintiff victory rates).  
 115. ABC Electric would likely require evidence from prior proceedings 
that plaintiff ’s allegations are false. For example, see Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 
898 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1990), where the court issued an injunction to prevent 
disparagement of property and for defamation causing harm to a business. 
 116. See infra notes 153–56 and accompanying text.  
 117. See infra notes 160–65 and accompanying text. 
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dicts the principle that diversity jurisdiction protects against 
out-of-state biases. These drawbacks are further exacerbated in 
the context of counterclaims. As the next section examines, the 
either-party approach ameliorates these inequitable weak-
nesses, but it does so in such a fashion that overly extends fed-
eral jurisdiction. 
B. EITHER-PARTY APPROACH 
The either-party approach, an alternative to the plaintiff 
viewpoint approach, assesses the value of the litigated object 
from the perspective of either the plaintiff or the defendant.118 
Proponents of the either-party approach argue that the diversi-
ty statute is silent regarding how courts should interpret its 
wording.119 For example, nothing in the diversity statute’s text, 
through the use of the words “sum,” “value,” or “matter in con-
troversy,” suggest it pertains only to the plaintiff ’s view-
point.120 The statute is silent, which leads to ambiguity, and 
under such circumstances interpretation should, among other 
things, mirror the history of the statute.121 Given this premise, 
endorsement of the either-party viewpoint is plausible consid-
ering it allows defendants a greater opportunity to remove cas-
es to federal court and avoid in-state biases.122  
Additionally, the either-party approach gives judges great-
er flexibility and discretion, while not blinding them to the true 
amount in controversy.123 In valuing the actual object of litiga-
tion from the viewpoint of either litigant, and not just its value 
to the plaintiff, the either-party viewpoint promotes equity and 
fairness. It does, however, have the side effect of increasing the 
number of cases eligible for federal court since consideration of 
the defendant’s cost of compliance occurs.124  
 
 118. See Miller v. First Serv. Corp., 84 F.2d 680, 681 (8th Cir. 1936) (ex-
plaining the test for jurisdiction as the amount the plaintiff claims to recover 
or the sum the defendant will lose). 
 119. See Brief for Petitioners at 6–7, Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley, 534 U.S. 
1126 (2002) (No. 01-896), 2002 WL 955476, at *6–7. 
 120. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners 
at 10–11, McCauley, 534 U.S. 1126 (No. 01-896), 2002 WL 939555, at *10–11. 
 121. See, e.g., Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 373–75 (2006) 
(using the history of the Bankruptcy Clause in reaching a decision). 
 122. See supra notes 112–17 and accompanying text.  
 123. See McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(explaining that federal courts should not be blinded “to the realities of the 
magnitude of the controversy” (citation omitted)). 
 124. See id. 
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The either-party rule admittedly allows a greater number 
of cases to be brought in federal court.125 It is important to note, 
however, that the additional cases achieving federal diversity 
jurisdiction are those in which the defendant’s cost of com-
pliance is greater than the diversity statute’s jurisdictional 
threshold amount. And this comports with one objective of di-
versity jurisdiction—providing a neutral forum to out-of-state 
defendants with sizeable disputes.126  
The either-party viewpoint is not, however, without draw-
backs. One such issue is its presumption that plaintiffs can de-
termine defendants’ costs of compliance. In some instances, es-
pecially antitrust cases that enumerate precise injunctive 
orders,127 ascertaining the defendant’s cost of compliance may 
be straightforward. For example, in the unfair competition case 
Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp., the plaintiff sought to enjoin Mi-
crosoft from coupling its Internet browser and computer soft-
ware programs.128 Since the defendant, upon an adverse deci-
sion, could no longer market its software suite as developed, 
the amount in controversy was the cost associated with design-
ing, developing, and testing a version of the software that 
would comply with the injunction.129 Because the defendant on-
ly had one way to comply with the injunction, determining the 
cost of compliance was relatively straightforward. 
Plaintiffs’ determination of the defendants’ cost of com-
pliance is not always so simple. In nuisance cases, for example, 
judges often allow the defendant to mitigate an offending action 
however it sees fit.130 For example, suppose Happy Apple Or-
chard files suit in an either-party district to enjoin the defend-
 
 125. See McInnis, supra note 5, at 1032 (explaining that the either-
viewpoint rule makes it easier for defendants to remove cases to federal court). 
 126. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 3703, at 558–61 (“[T]he purpose of 
a jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement—to keep trivial cases 
away from the federal court system—is satisfied when the case is worth a 
large sum of money to either party.”). But see Redish, supra note 24, at 1801–
03 (suggesting concerns other than restricting federal dockets as shaping ju-
risdictional rules). 
 127. See Keith N. Hylton, Remedies, Antitrust Law, and Microsoft: Com-
ment on Shapiro, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 773, 774 (2009) (explaining the precise 
nature of antitrust injunctive remedies). 
 128. Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1197 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2000). 
 129. See id. at 1198–99 (approximating the cost of designing, developing, and 
testing a new version that would comply with the injunction at $58.5 million). 
 130. See, e.g., Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers’ Supply Co., 109 N.W.2d 695, 
699 (Iowa 1961) (ordering the defendant to cease operation unless it could con-
tinue to operate without disturbing plaintiff ). 
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ant’s pollution. If the plaintiff ’s proposed benefit, measured by 
the increase in property value or improved apple yield, is less 
than the diversity statute’s threshold amount, Happy Apple 
Orchard can still obtain federal jurisdiction if the defendant’s 
cost of compliance is greater than the statutory requirement.131 
While Happy Apple Orchard could determine ABC Electric’s 
cost of compliance by dividing its annual profit by the number 
of days the injunction prevented operation of the factory, the 
defendant would likely be given permission to mitigate pollu-
tion by alternative means. Instead of closing the factory, the de-
fendant may choose to install clean-coal technology or engage 
in a cap-and-trade scheme. In other words, the plaintiff ’s calcu-
lation of the defendant’s cost of compliance, under an either-
party framework, is speculative and may conflict with the well-
pleaded complaint doctrine since it requires the plaintiff to 
surmise not only the defendant’s planned mitigation technique, 
but also the cost of such action.132 
The above-outlined example illustrates the potential ambi-
guities that exist if plaintiffs plead based on the defendants’ 
cost of compliance. This is somewhat mitigated, however, by 
the pleading framework established in Saint Paul Mercury In-
demnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.133 The standard allows dismissal or 
remand to state court only if the plaintiff ’s allegations “appear 
to a legal certainty” to be less than the jurisdictional amount.134 
Generally speaking, it is very difficult for defendants to over-
come the “legal certainty” standard.135 Although the “legal cer-
tainty” standard supports the either-party pleading require-
ments, it appears to conflict with the underlying principle that 
federal courts are limited in jurisdiction.136  
 
 131. See, e.g., McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d 389, 391–95 (7th 
Cir. 1979) (determining the amount in controversy from either the plaintiff ’s 
or defendant’s viewpoint). 
 132. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153 
(1908) (limiting pleading to plaintiff ’s cause of action and not defendant’s 
response). 
 133. 303 U.S. 283 (1938). 
 134. Id. at 289.  
 135. See, e.g., Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 511–13 (7th Cir. 
2006) (discussing the difficulty of overcoming the Red Cab Co. standard); Du-
chesne v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 758 F.2d 27, 28 (1st Cir. 1985) (“[W]hile it seems 
unlikely that [appellant] will recover [the jurisdictional amount], we cannot 
say that it is legally certain.”).  
 136. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (not-
ing the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, the presumption that a claim lies 
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Additionally, the Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly137 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal138 may make the either view-
point approach untenable. Twombly heightened pleading re-
quirements from “conceivable to plausible”139 and plaintiffs 
must now make “a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, 
of entitlement to relief.”140 Although no federal cases or scholar-
ly commentaries have addressed the application of Twombly to 
the amount-in-controversy pleading requirements and the Red 
Cab Co. “legal certainty” test, it seems reasonable that the 
Court will reexamine this standard—especially given Iqbal’s 
extension of Twombly to “all civil actions.”141 Not only does the 
“either-viewpoint approach” potentially conflict with the 
Twombly pleading requirements, but it is in disagreement with 
the historical basis—to limit jurisdiction—of the well-pleaded 
complaint doctrine.142  
One objective of requiring plaintiffs to plead with specifici-
ty is to improve judicial efficiency.143 The well-pleaded com-
plaint doctrine serves as a quick guidepost for resolving juris-
 
outside that jurisdiction, and that the party asserting jurisdiction has the bur-
den of overcoming that presumption).  
 137. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 138. 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940 (2009). 
 139. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
 140. Arthur D. Hellman, Another Voice for the “Dialogue”: Federal Courts 
as a Litigation Course, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 761, 767 (2009) (quoting Gregory 
P. Joseph, Federal Litigation—Where Did It Go Off Track?, LITIGATION, Sum-
mer 2008, at 5).  
 141. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1940 (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the 
pleading standard for ‘all civil actions,’ and it applies to antitrust and discrim-
ination suits alike.” (citation omitted)); see also Allison Sirica, Case Comment, 
The New Federal Pleading Standard: Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 62 FLA. L. REV. 547, 
550 (2010) (identifying questions about Twombly’s “applicability, implementa-
tion, and scope,” and noting uncertainty before Iqbal if “the Court intended to 
confine the heightened pleading standard to complex litigation, such as the 
antitrust claim in Twombly, or whether the heightened pleading standard ap-
plied more generally to all civil actions”). 
 142. See Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No Reason for It; It’s Just Our Poli-
cy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purpose of Federal 
Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 653 (1987) (noting that one of 
the well-pleaded complaint rule’s three purposes is to limit the amount of fed-
eral litigation). 
 143. See Roger A. Ragazzo, Reconsidering the Artful Pleading Doctrine, 44 
HASTINGS L.J. 273, 327–28 (1993) (“The well-pleaded complaint rule avoids 
the large costs of case-by-case investigation by fairly approximating the cases 
that belong in federal courts.”). 
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dictional disputes144 and allows litigants to determine the prop-
er forum at the outset of litigation.145 In other words, the doc-
trine acts as a means to improve judicial efficiency by stream-
lining the jurisdictional venue determination.146 Under the 
either-party viewpoint, however, it is not difficult to imagine a 
scenario in which the plaintiff alleges the jurisdictional thresh-
old is met, while the defendant claims its cost of compliance is 
actually far less. In such situations, it is common for the judge 
to order limited discovery as to whether the requisite jurisdic-
tional threshold is met,147 which further demonstrates that the 
either-viewpoint model curtails judicial efficiency.  
The either-party approach values the true object of litiga-
tion. As such, it eliminates the biases against out-of-state liti-
gants that are prevalent in the plaintiff-viewpoint approach. It, 
however, greatly extends federal jurisdiction and prevents cer-
tainty in pleading, neither of which characterize an ideal valua-
tion framework. A solution, as Part III proposes, is the moving-
party approach. It both protects against out-of-state biases and 
extends jurisdiction in a lesser manner than the either-party 
viewpoint.  
III.  THE MOVING-PARTY APPROACH: A BETTER 
VALUATION TECHNIQUE   
Part II examined how the plaintiff and either-party view-
points are undesirable because they fail to either value the 
amount at controversy from the perspective of both litigants, 
thereby perpetuating in-state biases, or because of the principle 
 
 144. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 
U.S. 1, 11 (1983) (“[T]he well-pleaded complaint rule makes sense as a quick 
rule of thumb.”). 
 145. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in 
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 36 (1989) (explaining that “a major 
justification for applying the [well-pleaded complaint] rule” is “to have a mech-
anism for deciding quickly whether a case falls within the competence of a fed-
eral trial court”).  
 146. See Mary P. Twitchell, Characterizing Federal Claims: Preemption, 
Removal, and the Arising-Under Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 54 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV 812, 821–22 (1986).  
 147. See, e.g., Rippee v. Bos. Mkt. Corp., 408 F. Supp. 2d 982, 983 (S.D. Cal. 
2005) (ordering the parties to engage in ninety days of limited discovery to de-
termine the amount in controversy); Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp., 91 F. Supp. 
2d 1196, 1197–98 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (permitting limited oral argument to as-
certain jurisdictional amount). But see Walsh v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 264 F. 
Supp. 514, 515 (E.D. Ky. 1967) (“Where there is doubt as to federal jurisdic-
tion, the doubt should be construed in favor of remanding the case to the State 
court where there is no doubt as to its jurisdiction.”). 
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that federal courts are limited in jurisdiction. This Part propos-
es endorsement of the moving-party approach as a way to miti-
gate these drawbacks. Although the technique is a minority 
valuation approach, drawing support almost exclusively from 
the District of Kentucky,148 it nonetheless is of sound rationale 
and adheres to the historical context of diversity jurisdiction. 
This is because the moving-party approach assesses the actual 
object of litigation from the perspective of both parties149 and 
circumvents limited jurisdiction and well-pleaded complaint is-
sues.150 Additionally, the moving-party approach avoids a race 
to the courthouse pleading scenario.  
This Part also outlines two ways in which implementation 
of the moving-party approach is feasible. The first is for courts 
to interpret the “original jurisdiction” language of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332 as conferring jurisdiction to the moving-party approach. 
An alternative, and more straightforward approach, however, 
is a legislative amendment to § 1332 that would specifically al-
low for the moving-party approach. 
A. ADVANTAGES OF THE MOVING-PARTY APPROACH 
The moving-party approach values the amount in contro-
versy from the plaintiff ’s viewpoint when establishing original 
jurisdiction and the defendant’s viewpoint upon removal.151 A 
benefit of such an approach, when compared to the plaintiff-
viewpoint model, is that it values the true amount in controver-
sy.152 Stated another way, it takes into account the defendants’ 
compliance costs in removal settings, thereby considering the 
totality of the circumstances and also mitigating in-state bi-
ases.  
Additionally, the moving-party approach prevents a race-
to-the-courthouse scenario that arises in the context of counter-
claims. In most jurisdictions, courts will not consider the value 
of a compulsory counterclaim for purposes of meeting the diver-
sity statute’s amount-in-controversy requirement.153 For exam-
 
 148. See, e.g., Bedell v. H.R.C. Ltd., 522 F. Supp. 732, 735 (E.D. Ky. 1981) 
(implementing the moving-party approach); Family Motor Inn, Inc. v. L-K En-
ters. Div. Consol. Foods Corp., 369 F. Supp. 766, 769 (E.D. Ky. 1973) (same). 
 149. See Bedell, 522 F. Supp. at 735.  
 150. See supra Part II.B. 
 151. See Bedell, 522 F. Supp. at 735. 
 152. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 3703, at 562–63. 
 153. See Mesa Indus., Inc. v. Eaglebrook Prods., Inc., 980 F. Supp. 323, 325 
(D. Ariz. 1997) (holding that a compulsory counterclaim cannot be used to sat-
isfy the jurisdictional amount); Cont’l Carriers, Inc. v. Goodpasture, 169 F. 
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ple, in Ingram v. Sterling154 the plaintiff filed suit in state court 
alleging $2650 in damages stemming from an automobile acci-
dent. The defendant subsequently filed a counterclaim for 
$15,450, well above the then-jurisdictional amount of $3000, 
and removed to federal court.155 Upon review, the federal court 
remanded the case after concluding that a counterclaim, even 
though compulsory, cannot establish federal subject-matter ju-
risdiction.156  
Strictly construing the removal statute appears to be the 
impetus for this interpretation. One commentator noted that 
such a practice is legally sound because it restricts the removal 
statute to its historical context.157 It “is, however, of questiona-
ble justice.”158 This is because denying jurisdiction to a compul-
sory counterclaim that satisfies the jurisdictional amount 
means that the litigant who wins the race to the courthouse is 
able to dictate forum selection. Essentially, a plaintiff asserting 
a small claim can force the opposing party, with a cognizable 
federal diversity claim, to litigate in state court since counter-
claims cannot satisfy the amount-in-controversy require-
ment.159  
Returning to the orchard example, suppose both parties in-
tend to file a request for injunction: the plaintiff to enjoin de-
fendant’s pollution and the defendant to enjoin plaintiff ’s def-
amation. Under the plaintiff-viewpoint approach, since the 
 
Supp. 602, 603–04 (M.D. Ga. 1959) (same); Nat’l Upholstery Co. v. Corley, 144 
F. Supp. 658, 661 (M.D.N.C. 1956) (“This court accepts without question the 
general proposition that the complaint normally determines the removability 
by the nonresident defendant and also agrees that a counterclaim is not avail-
able to increase the amount involved in the litigation.”); Jay Tidmarsh, Find-
ing Room for State Class Actions in a Post-CAFA World: The Case of the Count-
erclaim Class Action, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 193, 233 (2007) (noting that original 
claims, not counterclaims, establish federal jurisdiction). But see Swallow & 
Assocs. v. Henry Molded Prods., Inc., 794 F. Supp. 660, 663 (E.D. Mich. 1992) 
(“Because the damages pled in the defendant’s compulsory counterclaim ex-
ceed the amount in controversy prerequisite to federal diversity jurisdiction, 
this case was removed providently.”). A counterclaim arising out of the same 
“transaction or occurrence” as the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim 
is a compulsory claim and requires assertion in the pending case or it is barred 
from subsequent litigation. See, e.g., Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 
467, 469 n.1 (1974) (holding that a compulsory counterclaim must be asserted 
or “is thereafter barred”). 
 154. 141 F. Supp. 786, 786 (W.D. Ark. 1956). 
 155. Id.  
 156. Id. at 789. 
 157. Recent Decisions, 45 VA. L. REV. 737, 738 (1959). 
 158. Id. 
 159. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 3706, at 730–33. 
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court only values the amount in controversy from the plaintiff ’s 
perspective,160 jurisdiction is established by the party whose 
complaint is first filed. Conversely, under the moving-party ap-
proach whether the orchard or coal-fired power plant is the 
first party to the courthouse doors has no bearing on the forum 
for litigation. This is because ABC Electric can remove to fed-
eral court based on its compliance costs and then use federal 
supplemental jurisdiction to assert its compulsory counter-
claim.161  
To mitigate this courthouse race, a straightforward solu-
tion would be to allow defendants to establish jurisdiction 
based on the value of their compulsory counterclaim. A problem 
with such an approach, however, is that doing so then makes 
federal removal dependent upon each state court’s definition of 
permissive and compulsory claims.162 The practical conse-
quence of such a method is that removal then becomes depend-
ent upon state court rules, thereby eliminating uniformity in 
the federal system. An alternative solution, of course, is the 
moving-party approach, because it allows defendants to estab-
lish federal jurisdiction based on their cost of compliance and 
then assert a compulsory counterclaim under federal supple-
mental jurisdiction. Admittedly, the compulsory counterclaim 
will only achieve federal jurisdiction if the defendant’s cost of 
complying with the plaintiff ’s request is greater than the juris-
dictional amount. Such a rule, however, not only circumvents 
unfair treatment of defendants and gamesmanship by plain-
tiffs, but it maintains certainty in pleading that would other-
wise be lost if counterclaims could be used to satisfy the juris-
dictional amount.  
The primary advantages of the moving-party approach 
over the plaintiff-viewpoint model are its consideration of the 
amount in controversy from all litigants’ perspectives and its 
amelioration of the race-to-the-courthouse scenario. Although 
the either-party viewpoint also mitigates these drawbacks, it is 
less preferable than the moving-party approach because it over-
ly extends diversity jurisdiction. Under an either party frame-
work, the plaintiff is only required to meet the Red Cab Co. “le-
 
 160. See Dobie, supra note 3, at 734.  
 161. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006). 
 162. See Meridian Aviation Serv. v. Sun Jet Int’l, 886 F. Supp. 613, 615 
(S.D. Tex. 1995) (“[I]f compulsory counterclaims were considered [for purposes 
of jurisdiction], federal subject-matter jurisdiction would be reliant on state 
law distinctions between compulsory and permissive counterclaims.”). 
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gal certainty” standard for federal court admittance, and this 
inquiry is far less searching than the preponderance-of-the-
evidence removal burden present under the moving-party ap-
proach.163 Further, the moving-party approach does not allow 
plaintiffs to assert the defendants’ anticipated compliance costs 
as grounds for federal court admittance, which adheres to the 
well-pleaded complaint doctrine.164 As such, from a judicial effi-
ciency standpoint, the moving-party approach is more suitable 
than the either-party approach because the party seeking ju-
risdiction bears the burden of producing evidence that jurisdic-
tion is proper.165  
Courts should endorse the moving-party approach because 
it promotes fairness and equity in the adjudication of diversity 
jurisdiction injunction suits while still adhering to the principle 
that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. As one 
court noted, the moving-party approach is “preferable from the 
standpoint of logic, practicality, and [in] achieving the policies 
of the statutes creating removal jurisdiction.”166 Justification 
for endorsing the moving-party framework is even stronger af-
ter addressing the improper criticism it has garnered.  
B. UNFOUNDED CRITICISM OF THE MOVING-PARTY APPROACH 
The moving-party approach is a minority injunction valua-
tion technique. As such, relatively little commentary is availa-
ble outside the Sixth Circuit—the only jurisdiction where the 
viewpoint from which to value injunctions remains unsettled.167 
The commentary that is available, however, is of questionable 
rationale, especially given the current federal court pleading 
framework.  
 
 163. Cf. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale 
of Waste and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1571–72 (2008) (“[T]he courts, 
and especially the appellate courts, markedly appear to be converging on the 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, which requires a more-likely-than 
not showing. This still-tough approach against removal jurisdiction is seem-
ingly incongruent with the anything-goes flavor of the St. Paul test for original 
jurisdiction.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 164. Cf. Bedell v. H.R.C. Ltd., 522 F. Supp. 732, 735 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (de-
scribing original jurisdiction as established by the plaintiff ). 
 165. See Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 
1969) (explaining that the burden of removal lies on the defendant). 
 166. Bedell, 522 F. Supp. at 735. 
 167. See McIntire v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F. Supp. 2d 911, 920 (S.D. Ohio 
2001) (“District courts within the Sixth Circuit have recognized that the law is 
unsettled regarding whose viewpoint . . . should be considered in determining 
the value of an injunction case.”). 
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For example, in Southern States Police Benevolent Ass’n v. 
Second Chance Body Armor, Inc. the court criticized the mov-
ing-party approach because it “allow[s] either party to easily 
avoid the rule of non-aggregation.”168 Essentially, the court was 
concerned that such a framework would allow defendants to 
join claims in order to satisfy the jurisdictional amount. This 
decision, however, was issued prior to two key changes in fed-
eral subject-matter jurisprudence. First, in Exxon Mobil Corp. 
v. Allapattah Services, Inc., the Court held that so long as one 
claim satisfies the amount-in-controversy determination for di-
versity jurisdiction, joinder of claims by other plaintiffs may oc-
cur under supplemental jurisdiction even if they do not inde-
pendently satisfy the jurisdictional amount.169 Additionally, 
with the 2005 passage of the Class Action Fairness Act 
(CAFA),170 defendants can now join class action claims in order 
to satisfy the jurisdictional amount for purposes of diversity ju-
risdiction.171 Subsequent to Second Chance’s criticism of the 
moving-party approach,172 both the judicial and legislative 
branches altered their stance on the practice of claim aggrega-
tion, thereby undercutting Second Chance’s criticism.  
Commentators also note that the moving-party approach 
can cause anomalous results. For example, a case originally 
brought in federal court could be remanded to state court due 
to the plaintiff ’s failure to allege damages sufficient to meet the 
jurisdictional amount. Thereafter, however, the defendant 
could still remove the case back to federal court, citing his or 
her compliance costs as sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional 
amount.173 Although this potentially circuitous route exists,174 
it is likely no more than a theoretical argument since defend-
 
 168. S. States Police Benevolent Ass’n v. Second Chance Body Armor, Inc., 
336 F. Supp. 2d 731, 736 (W.D. Mich. 2004). 
 169. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005). 
 170. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. 
 171. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) (2006) (“In any class action, the claims of 
the individual class members shall be aggregated to determine whether the 
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000 . . . .”). 
 172. Second Chance, 336 F. Supp. at 736. 
 173. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 3703, at 563–64. 
 174. The law of the case doctrine, which notes that a decision by the high-
est court is final, may prevent the defendant from removing the case back to 
federal court if the jurisdictional amount was previously found insufficient by 
that court. Compare Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75, 85 n.1 (1997) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that courts would reject the claim if raised 
again), with Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 385 (2003) (holding that 
the doctrine does not pose an insurmountable obstacle to reexamination). 
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ants that wish to remain in federal court are unlikely to chal-
lenge the plaintiff ’s jurisdiction.175 Admittedly, the court can 
perform a sua sponte examination of the amount in controver-
sy, but this is unlikely to result in remand to state court be-
cause upon such an examination federal jurisdiction is proper 
“if it appears that for any member . . . the matter in controversy 
is of the value of the jurisdictional amount.”176 This language 
appears to afford jurisdiction for moving-party injunction cases, 
but the approach, according to some, still contradicts the re-
moval statute’s requirement that federal courts possess original 
jurisdiction in cases removed from state court.177 
For example, in Snow v. Ford Motor Co., the plaintiffs, in 
state court, requested damages and injunctive relief valuing 
eleven dollars per plaintiff, whereas the defendant’s cost of 
compliance was well above the jurisdictional amount.178 The 
court denied the defendant’s request for removal, stating it is 
“well-settled” that the federal court cannot exercise removal ju-
risdiction, absent a specific statutory exception, unless the case 
could have originally been brought in federal court by the 
plaintiff.179 Strict adherence to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 seems to be 
the primary concern regarding endorsement of the moving-
party approach.180  
This strict adherence to the removal statute’s “original ju-
risdiction” language, however, seems overly doctrinal given 
that courts look beyond the plaintiff ’s complaint when making 
 
 175. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72 (1939) (noting that the dam-
ages outlined in the complaint are left unchallenged unless the court has 
doubt regarding the “good faith of the allegations”). 
 176. Id. But see Saint Paul Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288–
89 (1938) (acknowledging that jurisdiction is improper only if it appears 
beyond a “legal certainty” that the claim is for less than the threshold amount, 
but remaining silent regarding the viewpoint for this determination). 
 177. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006) (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court 
of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, 
may be removed by the defendant . . . to the district court of the United 
States . . . .”). 
 178. Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 788 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 179. Id. at 789. 
 180. See, e.g., Am. Ass’n of Orthodontists v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., No. 
4:07-CV-351 (CEJ), 2007 WL 1687259, at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 28, 2007) (noting 
removal is proper only after examining the plaintiff ’s pleadings); cf. City of 
Chi. v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997) (“The propriety of re-
moval thus depends on whether the case originally could have been filed in 
federal court.”). 
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amount-in-controversy examinations after removal requests.181 
Often this occurs when plaintiffs, filing in state court and who 
are not concerned with requirements for federal subject-matter 
jurisdiction, leave the complaint silent as to the amount in con-
troversy.182 Although some federal courts will remand cases to 
state court under these circumstances,183 most courts look to 
the removal petition184 or undertake an independent examina-
tion of the amount in controversy to determine if jurisdiction is 
proper.185 
There is sound rationale in favor of allowing courts to 
make such an ad hoc inquiry beyond the plaintiff ’s complaint. 
One basis for such a practice is that it prevents plaintiffs from 
trying to evade federal jurisdiction by omitting factually rele-
vant allegations.186 For strategic reasons, the Happy Apple 
Orchard attorney may want to bring a claim against ABC Elec-
tric in state court. A jury selected from the surrounding com-
munity, many of whom are rural farmers, may be more sympa-
thetic to the orchard owner than a federally selected jury would 
be. In hopes of keeping the claim in state court, the complaint 
may remain silent regarding the citizenship of the parties or 
the amount in controversy. Further, some court rules prohibit 
plaintiffs from pleading specific damage amounts in state 
 
 181. See Family Motor Inn, Inc. v. L-K Enters. Div. Consol. Foods Corp., 
369 F. Supp. 766, 768 (1973) (indicating that the court may look to the petition 
for removal when the complaint fails to mention monetary damages); MOORE, 
supra note 7, ¶ 0.92[3.-2]. 
 182. Family Motor Inn, Inc., 369 F. Supp. at 768. 
 183. See, e.g., Gaitor v. Peninsular & Occidental S.S. Co., 287 F.2d 252, 254 
(5th Cir. 1961) (“It is . . . settled that a case non-removable on the complaint, 
when commenced, cannot be converted into a removable one by the evidence of 
the defendant or by an order of the court . . . .” (citing Great N. Ry. Co. v. 
Alexandar, 246 U.S. 276, 281 (1918))).  
 184. See, e.g., Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 
2001) (“If the jurisdictional amount is not facially apparent from the com-
plaint, the court should look to the notice of removal and may require evidence 
relevant to the amount in controversy at the time the case was removed.”); 
Jones & Laughlin Steel v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 282 n.1 
(3d Cir. 1980) (acknowledging that the complaint fails to allege diversity juris-
diction, but deciding that federal jurisdiction is proper given the allegation in 
the removal petition). 
 185. See, e.g., Jadair, Inc. v. Walt Keeler Co., 679 F.2d 131, 133 (7th Cir. 
1982) (disposing of subject-matter jurisdiction after the court’s inquiry into the 
defendant’s damages). 
 186. See 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3734, at 667 (4th ed. 2009) (“[S]uch a limitation would encour-
age a plaintiff who wished to remain in state court to plead in a way that 
would obscure any basis for removal.”). 
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court.187 Without the ability to look beyond the face of the com-
plaint to establish “original jurisdiction,” unfair dismissal of 
cases qualifying for removal jurisdiction occurs.  
Fortunately, the predominant federal court practice allows 
courts to look beyond the face of the plaintiff ’s complaint and 
consider factors in the record as a whole.188 This approach is 
sound given that there would be little point in requesting a 
“short and plain statement” supporting the grounds for removal 
in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) if a court could not consider the state-
ment when gauging the propriety of removal.189 For example, if 
a plaintiff pleads with an ad damnum clause,190 quantifying 
the extent of its damages, it would be illogical to prevent the 
defendant from making an inquiry as to the actual amount in 
controversy. Otherwise, all litigants wishing to remain in state 
court could plead less than the jurisdictional amount, and re-
moval to federal court would then be impossible. This is why 
defendants are allowed to look beyond the complaint and notice 
of removal to establish removal jurisdiction.191 Section 1446(b) 
also supports this practice and allows removal evidence 
through “stipulation, pre-removal discovery or other means.”192 
Additionally, possession of jurisdictional information to support 
a viable claim is often only in the possession of one party,193 
and thus it seems logical to allow establishment of jurisdiction-
al facts by the party who controls that information, as opposed 
to only the plaintiff.  
Not only will a court look beyond the original complaint 
upon a request for removal, but courts will do the same in the 
context of amended complaints. For example, in Kirby v. Amer-
ican Soda Fountain Co., the plaintiff filed suit in state court 
originally alleging $1500 in damages—well below the $2000 
statutory requirement in 1904—but later amended the com-
 
 187. See, e.g., Burk v. Med. Savs. Ins. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1067 (D. 
Ariz. 2004) (holding that the district court could look beyond the face of the 
complaint to establish original jurisdiction given that Arizona state court rules 
prohibit plaintiffs from pleading unliquidated damages).  
 188. See, e.g., Baccus v. Parrish, 45 F.3d 958, 960–61 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(“[C]ourts will typically look beyond the face of a complaint to determine 
whether removal is proper.”). 
 189. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 186, § 3734, at 671. 
 190. Defined as a statement estimating the amount in controversy from the 
plaintiff ’s perspective. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 40 (8th ed. 2004). 
 191. Hoffman, supra note 102, at 1250. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 1261. 
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plaint to above the threshold amount.194 The defendant then 
removed the case to federal court and counterclaimed for 
$1700.195 In response, Kirby requested the court to dismiss the 
case, arguing it should only consider the original complaint per 
the removal statute’s text.196 The Supreme Court affirmed the 
lower court’s grant of jurisdiction, noting that the plaintiff ’s 
amendment satisfied the jurisdictional requirement.197 
Section 1446(b) echoes this practice, stipulating that a pre-
viously unremovable case may be removed within thirty days of 
an “amended pleading, motion, order or other paper.”198 It is il-
logical to think Congress intended for district courts to look 
beyond the complaint for renewed removal actions, but did not 
intend for similar treatment of original complaints.199 This is 
another example of how courts will look beyond the original 
face of the complaint when ascertaining the amount in contro-
versy. 
The removal statute requires district courts to have origi-
nal jurisdiction,200 but since courts already look beyond the 
original complaint when it is silent as to jurisdictional elements 
or upon amendment, it seems logical to allow courts to do the 
same for purposes of endorsing the moving-party approach. Es-
pecially considering the moving-party approach will reduce in-
state biases without overly extending federal jurisdiction.  
C. IMPLEMENTING THE MOVING-PARTY APPROACH 
Endorsement of the moving-party approach is possible 
through two different routes. Since federal courts already look 
beyond the face of the complaint when assessing the suitability 
of removal jurisdiction, implementation of the moving-party 
approach can occur without any changes to the statutory 
framework. But given that no federal circuit courts have offi-
cially endorsed the moving-party approach, implementation 
would more likely need to come in the form of a Supreme Court 
order. As this section discusses, however, the procedural pos-
ture necessary for Supreme Court review is quite rare, and, in 
the alternative, Congress should implement the moving-party 
 
 194. Kirby v. Am. Soda Fountain Co., 194 U.S. 141, 141–42 (1904). 
 195. Id. at 142. 
 196. Id. at 142–43. 
 197. Id. at 144.  
 198. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006). 
 199. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 186, § 3734, at 671. 
 200. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 
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approach through an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  
A Supreme Court order can implement the moving-party 
approach. The Supreme Court tried resolving the circuit split in 
1992 in McCauley, but ultimately had to dismiss the case after 
determining that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) precluded appellate re-
view.201 In order for the Court to resolve the injunction valua-
tion dispute, it will require appeal of a case that was dismissed 
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as opposed to merely re-
manded to state court.  
In McCauley, multiple state actions filed against Ford were 
consolidated for pretrial purposes only.202 The district court 
found it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the 
case, but the Ninth Circuit granted review, deciding that 
§ 1447(d) was inapplicable because the lower court dismissed as 
opposed to remanded the action.203 The Supreme Court disa-
greed with this characterization, commenting during oral ar-
gument that consolidation was for pretrial purposes only and 
that remand was necessary after the completion of discovery.204 
The Court did not issue an opinion in McCauley, but it has pre-
viously held that courts hearing multidistrict litigation for pre-
trial purposes cannot issue binding decisions.205 With that in 
mind, it is likely that the Court dismissed McCauley because 
the district court was not allowed to make a binding decision on 
jurisdiction; rather, it could only remand to state court.  
Section 1447(d) does not, however, have to present an in-
surmountable obstacle to Supreme Court review. With consent 
of all parties involved, the transferee jurisdiction can perma-
nently consolidate claims.206 If the litigants in McCauley had 
agreed to a consolidated action for more than pretrial discovery 
purposes, the Court’s grant of certiorari would have been prov-
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ident and the Court could have resolved the injunction valua-
tion circuit split. 
Nonetheless, because the procedural posture necessary for 
appellate review of the viewpoint from which to value injunc-
tions is quite rare, implementation of the moving-party ap-
proach should occur in the form of a congressional amendment. 
Such an action would specifically extend federal diversity juris-
diction to the moving-party approach. Although the general 
tenor of Congress is to limit the number of diversity claims that 
reach federal courts,207 jurisprudential rules are constructed to 
prevent forum shopping and other gamesmanship.208 When 
necessary, courts devise rules that broaden federal jurisdiction 
in order to prevent abusive manipulation of the courts.209  
For example, Congress recently passed CAFA and ex-
panded the federal courts’ definition of original jurisdiction.210 
Deviating from the $75,000 and complete diversity requirement 
of § 1332(a), Congress extended original jurisdiction, in the con-
text of class action suits, to any action where the matter in con-
troversy exceeds $5,000,000 and “any member of a class of 
plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant.”211 
Endorsement of CAFA demonstrates that Congress will alter 
jurisdictional rules to prevent inequities and forum shop-
ping.212  
Accordingly, Congress should explicitly amend the diversi-
ty and removal statutes to allow defendants to use their com-
pliance costs as a means to satisfy the amount-in-controversy 
requirement. Such an amendment is possible since both diver-
sity jurisdiction and removal are statutorily, as opposed to con-
stitutionally, derived.213 Although a moving-party amendment 
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to diversity jurisdiction expands federal jurisdiction, it does so 
in a lesser fashion than the either-party approach and prevents 
the inequitable race-to-the-courthouse scenario present under 
the plaintiff-viewpoint framework. An amendment would cur-
tail gamesmanship, while only marginally expanding jurisdic-
tion.  
Moreover, implementation of such a practice would require 
no ancillary changes in how courts value the amount in contro-
versy. Jurisdiction-specific valuation practices, such as whether 
to value corporate “good will” or future, immature, and contin-
gent claims would remain unchanged. Plaintiffs wishing to liti-
gate in state court would plead according to local procedure, 
and defendants could remove to federal court if their com-
pliance costs exceeded the jurisdictional requirement. 
The circuit courts lack a uniform injunction valuation 
technique for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, but implement-
ing the moving-party approach will ameliorate this discord. 
Such action is desirable because uniformity in the federal 
courts is not only a topic of extensive scholarly discussion,214 
but it is also reflected in the U.S. Supreme Court docket—
seventy percent of which is devoted to addressing legal issues 
over which lower courts have differed.215 Facilitation of the 
moving-party approach will ameliorate the circuit split and do 
so in a fashion that values the true amount in controversy 
without overly extending jurisdiction.  
  CONCLUSION   
The circuit courts are split regarding the viewpoint for in-
junction valuation, and this creates a jurisprudential model 
that leaves litigants uncertain as to their ultimate forum for lit-
igation.216 The plaintiff-viewpoint framework is easy to apply, 
but it fails to consider the true value of the litigated object, it 
promotes in-state prejudices, and it is susceptible to jurisdic-
tional gamesmanship. Meanwhile, the either-party viewpoint 
conflicts with the well-pleaded complaint doctrine and extends 
federal diversity jurisdiction in a manner that is inconsistent 
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with the historical context of the diversity statute. The moving-
party approach, however, more accurately takes into account 
the true value of litigation from the perspective of all parties 
and it mitigates in-state prejudices. Further, the moving-party 
approach comports with the well-pleaded complaint doctrine 
and extends federal diversity jurisdiction in a lesser fashion 
than the either-party viewpoint. Because the procedural pos-
ture necessary for judicial implementation of the moving-party 
approach is quite rare, Congress should amend the diversity 
statute so as to specifically implement the moving-party ap-
proach. 
